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Summary 
 
Modern telecommunications technology is now widely seen as a critical driver in 
economic development.  However, the issues involved in the rapid deployment of this 
technology are complex and frequently highly controversial.  While some of these issues 
are technical, the most difficult ones involve changing a legal and regulatory framework 
which was originally designed for different times and different technologies.  The process 
of changing this framework necessarily involves disruptive change for existing service 
providers as well as substantial benefits for the economy at large.  This paper seeks to 
discuss these issues in light of Turkey’s progress to date in taking advantage of advanced 
available telecommunications technology and the myriad productivity-enhancing services 
that are associated with it.
1   
 
An important element in developing a more competitive and dynamic sector in 
Turkey has been the desire of the country to become a member of the European Union.  
This has encouraged changes in the telecommunications regulatory regime following the 
guidelines set out in Chapter 19 of the EU “acquis” for candidate members.  Nonetheless, 
substantial further efforts are needed to complete and implement the desired regulatory 
framework,  particularly  as  it  affects  the  former  government  monopoly  carrier,  Turk 
Telekom,  and  the  cable  companies.  A  further  limiting  factor  has  been  an  overall 
investment climate in Turkey which has been characterized by a high level of uncertainty 
for most investors, regardless of size or nationality. 
 
Policy recommendations to help accelerate the deployment of telecommunications 
technology include a clear reaffirmation of the government’s priorities for the sector, a 
reduction in the level of ownership and regulatory uncertainty, strengthening the Board 
and Staff of the Telecommunications Authority, and reviewing policies which reduce the 
scope and increase the cost of telecommunication licenses. 
 
 
Background 
 
  Before discussing the status of telecommunications infrastructure and policy in 
Turkey, i t  w i l l  b e  h e l p f u l  t o  r e v i e w  b r i e f l y  w h y  m o d e r n  t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  a r e  s o  
important for economic development
2 and how the technology has advanced in recent 
years. 
   2 
Most  studies  by  economists  conclude  that  a  modern  telecommunications 
infrastructure has a substantial impact on economic growth.  Based on samples of 47 and 
124  countries,  Norton  (1992)  concludes  that  in  economic  development  “a 
telecommunications  infrastructure  …must  be  viewed  as  at  least  as  important  as 
conventional economic forces such as stable money growth, low inflation and an open 
economy.”
3  Roller and Waverman (2001) found that one-third of the economic growth in 
a group of 21 OECD countries over the 20-year period, 1970-1990, could be attributed to 
the direct and indirect impact of the telecommunications sector.
4  This author has studied 
the remarkable economic transformation of Ireland in the 1990s, which owed much of its 
impetus to timely investment in a modern telecommunications system.
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One major channel of impact on economic growth is through the reduction in 
transactions costs, of which communications costs are a good example.  Forty years ago, 
a three-minute call between London and New York cost $9.00; today, it is just a few 
cents.  Such a cost reduction stimulates the exchange of information and the volume of 
transactions.  More generally, lower costs of communication expand a firm’s markets and 
supplier base, help buyers and sellers acquire better pricing information at a lower cost, 
and reduce the risks in making contracts and allocating capital. 
 
  More recently, with the growth of “broadband” communications, firms have been 
able  to  radically  restructure  their  organization  and  operations.  Nearly  any  activity 
traditionally carried out within the firm (or by its suppliers) that can be “digitized” can 
now be physically located anywhere in the world with the requisite labor supply and 
telecommunications infrastructure.  For many kinds of products and services, geographic 
constraints  on  marketing  or  sourcing  have  nearly  disappeared.  While  potentially 
disruptive in the short-term (as economic growth generally is, especially for existing 
firms), “the death of distance” has helped create jobs and raise living standards where the 
necessary environment for the effective deployment of the technology exists.  Ireland and 
India are two prominent examples of such a positive impact. Table I (below) provides an 
overview  of  the  various  ways  in  which  lower-cost  telecommunications  can  support 
economic growth. 
 
 
Telecommunications: Infrastructure v. Services 
It is helpful to make the distinction between telecommunications infrastructure 
and the many types of services (voice telephony, text and email, data, video, internet, 
etc.) which are delivered by that infrastructure. The telecommunications infrastructure 
can be roughly distinguished by the following types of networks: 
 
Fixed line networks. These include Public Switched Line Networks (PSTN), the 
traditional copper wire analog telephone circuits and switches, as well as newer fixed 
lines  systems  that  encompass  digital  transmission,  optical  fiber  cable  and s i m i l a r  
advances. Cable companies originally established for the delivery of television are part of 
this group. In the future, this category may well include the electric power grid, where the 
basic infrastructure is already in place.
6  With the exception of microwave transmission   3 
TABLE  I.  TOTAL  FACTOR  PRODUCTIVITY  IMPACTS  OF A D V A N C E S  I N  
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLGY 
 
  Activity  Examples  Illustrative implications 
#1  Decision-making involved 
in allocating resources with 
a given amount of 
information 
Substitution of phone 
call/conference call/video-
conferencing for face-to- 
face meetings 
Reduction in cost and cycle 
time in decision-making 
#2  Collection of information  Remote real-time scanning; 
online product/service 
search 
Deterrence of criminal 
activity; prediction of flood 
crests; equipment 
monitoring 
#3  Distribution of information  Online data banks; vendor 
web sites 
Ability to make marginally 
better decisions with more 
information; trans-
formation of uncertainty 
into risk 
#4  Financial market arbitrage  Global financial markets  Reduction in cost of capital 
and improved liquidity in 
markets 
#5  Substitution of information 
for fixed capital 
 
Ability to single-track 
railways; reduce 
inventories 
Reduced capital investment  
#6  Creation of value-added 
services 
Off-shore software 
development; processing 
and analysis of financial 
and medical data; remote 
operating control 
Lower cost of service 
activities; shifts in location 
of value-added activity 
 
systems,  these  types  of  networks  do  not  require  publicly-supervised  allocation  of 
through-the-air bandwidth.  However, they do require extensive “rights of way” to put in 
place the transmission infrastructure. 
 
Wireless networks.  These networks are distinguished by their heavy reliance on 
through-the-air bandwidth for terrestrial-based transmission of analog and digital signals 
containing  the  various  services  mentioned  above.  Many  wireless  networks  also  rely 
heavily  on  fixed  networks  for  some  portion  of  their  transmission  chain,  since  they 
interconnect with them.  Mobile telephony is the most visible type of wireless network.  
However,  broadband  services  transmitted  at  local  “fixed  wireless”  points,  such  as 
shopping centers or university campuses, are increasingly common in many countries. 
The right to use specific transmission frequencies is generally allocated by governments. 
 
  Satellite-based  networks.  Once  thought  to  be  the  future  of  international 
telecommunications, satellite networks are now largely used for television broadcasting   4 
to  subscribers,  and  for  military  and  niche  commercial  applications,  such  as  vehicle 
positioning  information. S a t e l l i t e s  c a n  a l s o  b e  u s e d  f o r  i n t e r n e t  s e r v i c e s ,  u s u a l l y  i n  
conjunction with fixed line facilities (needed for “uploads” from the user). Here, too, 
transmission  frequencies  must  be  allocated  through  some  government-supervised 
process. 
 
  Think of the three different types of infrastructure (as well as alternative types of 
delivery technology within each basic type) as competing “pipelines.” The two critical 
factors  in  competing  are  the  volume  of  traffic  that  can  be  transmitted  (frequently 
expressed as “bandwidth”) and the cost of building and maintaining a particular type of 
infrastructure. Helped greatly by a competitive environment, technology breakthroughs 
of  the  past  several  decades  have  resulted  in  extraordinary  reductions  in  cost,  as  the 
diagram tracking the costs of transoceanic telephone circuits demonstrates.
 7 
 
Given  the  continuing  rapid  change  in  telecommunications  technology  and 
continued experimentation in the development of telecommunications-based services, it  
 
 
TRENDS IN TRANSOCEANIC CIRCUIT COSTS IN 1995 DOLLARS 
1965-2005 
 
 
                   Source: The Challenge Forum 
 
 
is wishful thinking to believe that any one person, firm or government can determine 
what the optimal infrastructure should be for any country. Making such a determination, 
and trying to enforce it, would be certain to block innovation and stifle the competitive 
forces that help to drive down costs. The alternative approach, which is embodied in the 
2002  European  Commission  Directive  on  competition  in  electronic  communications 
networks and services, is to encourage a viable, competitive marketplace to make such 
decisions.
8 Certainly mistakes will be made, as they were in the internet “bubble” years 
of the late 1990s, but the costs of those failures will be borne largely by those who made 
the investments. 
 
  Similar  arguments  apply  to  the  deployment  of  services  which  use  the 
telecommunications infrastructure.  In general, deciding which “pipeline” should deliver 
Cost per year of 
operation of a 
trans-oceanic 
telephone circuit, 
1995 dollars.   5 
a particular service is best left to  a competitive market.  Voice telephony  is a classic 
example. Originally dismissed as a narrow niche market, wireless telephony is now more 
widely deployed than fixed line telephony in many countries, including Turkey. More 
recently, telephony using traditional PSTN systems is being challenged by internet-based 
services (“VOIP”), particularly for international calling and within large corporations. A 
competitive market is far better at encouraging and evaluating new services, and selecting 
the optimal “pipeline”, than some government-sanctioned “master plan” or regulatory 
authority determinations. 
 
 
The Current Status of Telecommunications Deployment in Turkey 
Taking  a  snapshot  of  where  Turkey  stands  as  of  mid-2005  in  deploying 
telecommunications technology is hampered by the lack of timely data, an accelerating 
program  of  regulatory  liberalization,  and  substantial  uncertainties  regarding  the 
privatization  of  the  incumbent  de  facto m o n o p o l y  f i x e d  l i n e  c a r r i e r ,  T u r k  T e l e k o m  
(TTK). However, based on a review of the available data and a series of interviews and 
discussions with industry participants, customers, and regulators, the following tentative 
conclusions have been drawn: 
 
 
1.  The  basic  physical  framework  for  the  principal  competing  infrastructure 
“pipelines” is present, although not fully developed, especially in terms of its 
ability to deliver broadband services.  Infrastructure in the eastern part of the 
country  is  spotty.  Satellite-based  services  are  available.  Cable  companies 
operate in the principal cities of the country.  While personal computer (PC) 
penetration  is  low,  an  increasing  percentage  of  mobile  phones  have  some 
internet access. 
 
2.  At present, the development and deployment of new services and additional 
infrastructure  is  being  severely  hampered  by  lengthy  regulatory  delays, 
difficulties associated with the policies of TTK and issues arising out of its 
privatization and loss of monopoly over fixed line telephony. 
 
3.  Despite (2), the liberalization program has attracted some new entrepreneurial 
investment  and  management  into  the  telecommunication  sector.  More  is 
probable  if  uncertainties  regarding  the  regulatory  regime  and  TTK’s 
privatization are promptly resolved. 
 
4.  The advent of limited competition in Turkey has helped to reduce the cost of 
many telecommunications services, although they still remain high compared 
to most other OECD countries.  This is particularly the case when taxes on the 
sector and its customers are factored in. 
 
5.  A  problem  that  affects  most  economic  sectors  in  Turkey,  but  which  has 
particular  relevance  for  telecommunications,  is  an  investment  climate  that   6 
poses special hurdles for “outsiders” – large or small, domestic or foreign.  
Such hurdles include the lack of a well-functioning capital market, a banking 
system with limited expertise in working with technologically-oriented firms, 
and  a  relatively  opaque  regulatory  process  that  tends  to  favor  existing 
enterprises, particularly if they are part of a major family-controlled holding 
company. 
 
 
Infrastructure Systems 
 
As  in  many  other  countries  over  the  past  two d e c a d e s ,  T u r k e y ’ s  
telecommunications sector has shown significant growth.  Chart I shows the growth of 
telephone subscribers in Turkey, 1980-2004.  Three important trends stand out.  First, it 
was  not  until  the  late  1980s  that  the  percentage  of  the  population  connected  to  the 
network started to rise from exceptionally low levels.  This lack of connectivity did not 
reflect a lack of demand: in 1987 the backlog of requests for main line telephone service 
exceeded two million would-be subscribers.  This situation largely reflected the presence 
of a capital-starved state monopoly provider. The backlog did not drop below one million 
units until 1994.
 9  A second important trend has been the rapid growth of mobile phone 
subscribers beginning, effectively, in the late 1990s.  The third trend, which is closely 
related (and evident in many other countries), is the stagnation in the number of fixed line 
subscribers.  By 2004, the number of mobile subscribers exceeded by 15 million those 
with fixed lines.
10 
 
While progress has been impressive in deploying wireless telephony, an equally 
relevant  question  is  how  Turkey  compares  to  other  countries.  Chart  II  provides  a 
comparison in total telephone subscribers against four other countries and the European     
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           Source: ITU database   7 
average as of 2003. By this measure, Turkey is close to Poland’s penetration rate, but 
well below Greece and the European average.
11  Data on the number of business leased 
lines unfortunately is not available (but see the discussion below on leased line pricing). 
 
  While Turkey’s telephone system, in terms of its penetration rate, appears to be 
relatively satisfactory, given the country’s income level, the same cannot be said for its 
development of cable systems and broadband delivery.  This is bothersome, especially 
since cable franchises have been awarded for 20 cities that together cover roughly 80% of 
the Turkish market.  The Istanbul metropolitan area alone contains roughly 12 million of 
Turkey’s 70 million people.  According to industry sources, as of 2004, cable systems 
had about 1.3 million subscribers with an existing infrastructure capable of reaching 2.6 
million households.
12  
 
The  International  Telecommunications  Union  estimates  that  there  were  six 
million  internet  users  (including  dial-up  PSTN  users)  in  2003.    However,  broadband 
penetration rates are a fraction of the OECD average, although they fare somewhat better 
against comparisons with Poland and Greece, as Chart III (below) demonstrates.  Part of 
the explanation undoubtedly lies with the low level of personal computer ownership (4.31 
per 100 inhabitants in 2003 v. the 22.43 average for Europe).  More important may have 
been the relatively high cost of ADSL until August 2004, when the dominant provider 
(TTK) cut its charges by well over 80% for most services and launched a major program 
to  provide  additional  ADSL  ports.  Subscribers  by  year-end  2005  were  expected  by 
management to reach one million, up from 455,000 at the end of 2004. 
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   8 
Broadband penetration for Turkey (and other countries) is actually higher since an 
increasing  number  of  mobile  phones  are  internet-capable.  According  to  one  industry 
source, 6-7 million of Turkey’s 35 million mobile phone subscribers in 2005 have access 
to the internet via their devices.  An  additional  element  in  under-reporting  broadband 
access is the existence of internet cafes, which are common in most Turkish urban areas, 
and which provide access at relatively low cost. 
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  Internet access for educational institutions is uneven.  At the university level, it 
appears that nearly all institutions have broadband access with fairly high degrees of 
reliability.  At the primary and secondary level, the Ministry of Education, working with 
TTK, intends to provide all 40,000 schools in the country with ADSL.  According to 
TTK sources, as of mid-2005, 20,000 schools had been connected.  The most difficult 
connections will be at 3-4000 relatively remote locations, mostly in the eastern part of the 
country. 
 
 
Service Availability 
While  the  basic  “pipelines”  for  delivery  of  telecommunications  services  are 
present in most major markets within Turkey, the development of new products and the 
“bundling” of products have been retarded by several factors.  First, TTK has historically 
been  slow  to  introduce  new  services  in  fixed  line  telephony.  In  recent  years,  when 
liberalization of the telecommunications market made it clear that new competitors were 
going to appear, product development and marketing have assumed a higher priority. 
   9 
A second reason for sluggish growth has been the licensing process adopted by 
the recently-established Telecommunications Authority.  Long delays in the issuance of 
licenses, their cost and their narrow scope have frustrated would-be entrants into the 
market,  as  well  as  the  few  already-established  firms.  In  the  case  of  cable  system 
operators,  licenses  for  new  cable-based  services  have  been  approved  by  the 
Telecommunications  Authority  but  require  final  approval  by  the  Minister  of 
Transportation, which has been slow in forthcoming. 
 
 
Pricing of Telecommunications Services 
  An  important  indicator  of  competition  is  the  degree  of  price  competition.  
Obtaining an up-to-date overview of pricing in any country’s telecommunications market 
today is extremely difficult, given the need to construct the basket of rates available to a 
representative user, to consider the different pricing schedules by different firms and to 
evaluate  tariff  rates  against  other  countries’  structures.  However,  based  on  the  most 
recent available OECD survey of member countries’ pricing structures (2004), Turkey  
continues  to  be  a  relatively  high-cost  country  for  most  services,  with  the  notable 
exception of domestic leased lines, an important business service (Table II). An important 
element in the cost to users is taxes, which in Turkey’s case are substantial: 55%-60% in 
the case of mobile phone calls.
13 In Europe, taxes generally range from 7%-20%.
14 (In the 
United States, the highest combined Federal-State tax rate is 21%.) Table II provides 
selected tariffs for 2002 and 2004 for several telecommunications services.
15 
 
 
TABLE II. TURKISH TELECOMMUNICATION CHARGES RELATIVE TO 
OECD AVERAGES 
 
                                               OECD Average = 100 
 
Service        8/2002  8/2004 
Composite basket of 
residential charges* 
148  164 
Composite basket of business 
telephone charges* 
179  153 
Basket of international 
business charges* 
262  121 
Basket of national leased line 
charges 
96  80 
Basket of high user mobile 
phone charges, including VAT 
183  160 
        
       Source:  Calculated from price tables in OECD Communications Outlook (2003 and 2005- 
       preliminary). Domestic currency charges converted at $US purchasing parity exchange rates 
                    *Inclusive of tax 
   10 
  With the exception of leased line charges, Turkish rates tend to be somewhat 
higher than the OECD average.  As the table shows, the August 2004 tariff reductions by 
TTK were especially  large  for  international  rates  (probably  in  response  to  increasing 
competition f r om V OI P pr ovide r s) , but they  still r e ma in me a sur a bly  g re a te r tha n the 
OECD average.  The relatively low leased line charges may well reflect the ability of 
larger  business  users  to  use  competitive  satellite  services  in  place  of  TTK  landlines.  
Although they are widely deployed, mobile phone charges are substantially in excess of 
the OECD average, no doubt due largely to the heavy tax burden. 
 
 
Turk Telekom Issues 
  Perhaps because of a long history of state involvement in the economy, Turkey 
has  been  extremely  late  in  recognizing  the  desirability  of  privatizing  its  state-owned 
monopoly fixed line provider.  Advisors to the government (most notably, the IMF) have 
had  trouble  convincing  it  of  the  linkages  between  communications  privatization, 
increased  competition,  and  economic  development.  After  two  unsuccessful  efforts  to 
privatize TTK, a third effort was successful in 2005 when a controlling 55% interest was 
sold to foreign investors.  Additional shares were slated to be sold in a public offering. 
 
  The primary benefit from a successful privatization of TTK will be a more level 
playing field for the company’s competitors, thus helping to accelerate the deployment of 
new technology and services. Although a privatized TTK might compete more vigorously 
than in the past, it will lose its standing as a state-owned company (a matter of no small 
importance  in  Turkey)  in  regulatory  proceedings  before  the  telecommunications  and 
competition authorities.  They are likely to be less sympathetic to TTK’s explanations for 
its reluctance to provide competitors with access to its facilities and rights of way (as is 
generally  required  by  the  liberalization  program).  TTK’s  appeals  and  noncompliance 
with Telecommunications Authority decisions, frequent in the past, are likely to be less 
favorably viewed by the courts.  Nonetheless, it can be expected that TTK will continue 
to be aggressive in the marketplace as well as in the regulatory process as it tries to 
maintain its revenues against new competitors.   
 
An unfortunate byproduct of the TTK privatization process has been its impact on 
cable system investment. The original cable companies were established as joint ventures 
between TTK and private operators. As part of the liberalization/privatization process, 
TTK was required to transfer its cable assets to the government entity responsible for 
communications satellites.  However, this is envisioned only as an interim solution and 
some ambiguity surrounds the ownership claims of the private operators.  Such ambiguity 
and related uncertainty about the delivery of new services are holding back investment in 
a  critical  telecommunications  pipeline.  The  delay  is  especially  bothersome  because  it 
comes at a time when TTK, as the overwhelmingly dominant DSL broadband operator, 
should be facing stronger competition. 
 
 
   11 
The Regulatory Environment 
Turkey’s intention to join the European Union (EU) means that its regulatory 
framework will have to conform with that specified by Chapter 19 of the EU “acquis” for 
candidate members.  The principles underlying Chapter 19 are driven by the EU’s Lisbon 
Strategy  of  March  2000,  which  sought  to  make  the  EU  “the  most  competitive  and 
dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 2010.” To accomplish this objective, the strategy 
stresses that “businessmen and citizens must have access to an inexpensive, world-class 
communications  infrastructure.”
16 T o  i m p l e m e n t  s t r a t e g y  i n  t h e  t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  
sector, the European Commission has issued a set of directives which became effective in 
July 2003. 
 
  The  directives  cover  a  wide  range  of  subjects,  including  the  elimination  of 
restrictions  on  competition,  simplification  of  licensing  criteria,  access  to  service 
(“universal service”), personal data protection, and the organization, staffing and powers 
of  the  relevant  telecommunications  regulatory  authority.
17 T h e  E U ’ s  a p p r o a c h  
emphasizes that governments should follow a policy of “technical neutrality,” e.g., by 
avoiding favoring one particular “pipeline” over another in the delivery of services, such 
as voice telephony and internet access. 
 
The  2004  EU  report  on  Turkey’s  progress  in  meeting  Chapter  19  accession 
requirements noted that substantial further efforts were needed to complete the regulatory 
framework, as well as more evidence of effective implementation and enforcement of the 
Commission’s rules.
18  An earlier OECD (2002) Report had similar recommendations, as 
well as specific suggestions for simplifying the licensing process.
19  
 
A particular concern for both the OECD and the EU is the Turkish authority’s 
tendency  to  limit  entry  into  telecommunications  services  that  do  not  involve  the 
allocation of scarce resources, such as radio frequencies or satellite positions. This is 
accomplished  by  restrictive  licensing.  The  preferred  alternative,  as  called  for  in  EU 
directives, is that “electronic communications services or networks should be provided on 
the basis of a general authorization and not on the basis of a license”.
20 
 
  While  the  government  of  Turkey  has  frequently  affirmed  the  importance  of 
developing  the  country’s  telecommunications  sector,  typically  in  statements  by  the 
Minister  of  Transportation,  the  actual  priority  given  to  this  effort  is  frequently  in 
question.  Too  many  policy  decisions  have  had  the  effect  of  limiting  competition, 
discouraging foreign capital inflows, and looking to the sector more as a “cash cow” for 
raising tax revenue than as an engine for economic growth. 
 
Turkey has had an independent telecommunications regulator only since 2000.  
Prior to that time, telecommunications issues (outside radio/TV broadcasting content) 
were  handled  by  the  Ministry  of  Transportation.  Consequently,  the  Turkish 
Telecommunications Authority (TA), at both board member and staff levels, is still in the 
process  of  gaining  experience  and  issuing  basic  regulations  regarding  such  areas  as 
infrastructure competition, market definitions, and quality of service standards. Several   12 
important decisions have been challenged in court by TTK.  With one exception, board 
members  are  chosen  from  career  government  civil  servants  who  may  have  little 
background in current technology and market issues.  Recruitment of qualified staff is 
hampered by civil service salary caps. 
 
  The  Minister  of  Transportation  remains  responsible  for  overall  government 
telecommunications policy, proposes names for TA board members to the Cabinet, and 
exercises veto power over changes in license fees proposed by the TA.  Prior to TTK’s 
privatization, the Minister exercised oversight over that company’s operations.  He also 
oversees Turksat, the government operator of Turkey’s three communications satellites 
and presently the holder of TTK’s former cable company assets. (A prompt and pro-
competitive transfer of these assets to the private sector should be a high priority for the 
Ministry.) 
 
  Effective January 1, 2004, the legal monopoly of TTK over fixed line telephony 
was  abolished.  However,  in  the  absence  of  implementing  regulations  from  the 
Telecommunications Authority and due to the uncertainties surrounding the privatization 
of TTK, no alternative fixed line suppliers have emerged as of early 2006.  However, new 
firms have entered the telecommunications sector as resellers of TTK capacity (calling 
card and long distance services, for example) or as suppliers of equipment for managing 
corporate communications more efficiently. Interviews with industry sources emphasized 
the increasingly competitive conditions in these areas. 
 
  The Turkish Competition Authority, functioning since 1997, performs functions 
similar  to  that  of  the  Federal  Trade  Commission  or  the  Antitrust  Division  of  the 
Department of Justice in the United States.  It has been involved in several important 
issues  within  the  telecommunications  sector,  such  as  requiring  TTK’s  disposal  of  its 
cable  company  interests.  At  times,  friction  between  the  Competition  and 
Telecommunications  authorities  has  been  a  problem,  although  this  is  not  an  unusual 
situation in most countries. 
 
  Despite the problems discussed above, there is no doubt that the EU, along with 
the OECD and the IMF, has played an important role in encouraging Turkey to liberalize 
its  telecommunications  sector.  The  EU  “roadmap”  for  telecommunications  regulatory 
reform,  plus  financial  and  technical  assistance
21  t o  h e l p  i m p l e m ent  it,  have  been 
particularly  helpful.  The  “roadmap”  was  an  important  stimulus  behind  legislation 
revising the licensing regime and other aspects of the regulatory regime  that was pending 
in the Turkish parliament in early 2006. 
   
The Overall Investment Climate 
  The rapid deployment of telecommunications technology depends above all on 
the environment for investment and risk-taking.  Easy entry by investors into the sector is 
a function not only of the regulatory regime, but also of the overall investment climate. In 
this  respect,  Turkey  has  earned  a  rather  mixed  reputation.  In  addition  to  substantial 
telecommunications-specific  “regulatory  uncertainty,”  Turkey’s  overall  investment   13 
climate has high levels of uncertainty, particularly with respect to the legal system.  This 
affects all investors, large or small, foreign or domestic. 
 
In  The  World  Bank’s  “Doing  Business”  comparative  evaluation  system,  as  of 
2004, Turkey was rated a lowly “1” and “2” respectively (out of a possible 10) in the 
Bank’s “Legal Certainty” and ‘Disclosure” evaluation systems.
22 In the Global Economic 
Forum’s 2006 Global Competitiveness rankings, Turkey ranked 59
th out of 125 countries.   
A still unresolved bitter, multibillion dollar lawsuit involving the mobile phone company, 
Telsim, and its Turkish partner and two foreign investor-suppliers has not helped the 
attractiveness of Turkey’s climate for foreign investors. 
 
Foreign  investors,  particularly  those  considering  controlling  investments  in 
existing, high-profile Turkish-controlled firms, are likely to face opposition from Turkish 
nationalists.  Such nationalism was openly stated to be the reason for a Turkish owner of 
Turkcell (the dominant cell phone provider) reneging on an agreement to sell its stake to 
the Nordic telecommunications provider TeliaSonera in May 2005. 
 
A very “thin” capital market, a lack of venture capital, and a commercial banking 
system with little experience in innovative lending are further deterrents to new entrants. 
The high rates of inflation and extremely volatile financial markets of the recent past 
were  important  factors  in  creating  this  climate.  What  new  investment  did  take  place 
tended to be by existing firms, typically units of large holding companies.  Progress over 
the  last  several  years  in  bringing  inflation  under  control a n d  i n  s u s t a i n i n g  h e a l t h y  
economic  growth  has  been  encouraging.  This  raises t h e  p o s s i b i l i ty ,  despite  a  foreign 
exchange mini-tempest in the first half of 2006, that the financial system will evolve in a 
healthier  direction.  Substantial  investment i n  T u r k i s h  b a n k s  b y  f o r e i g n  f i n a n c i a l  
institutions in the past two years has been encouraging. 
 
Despite  the  deterrents  to  investment  discussed  above,  a  number  of  start-up 
companies,  encouraged  by  the  liberalization  program, h a v e  recently  entered  the 
telecommunications sector.  In most cases they are headed by Turkish entrepreneurs with 
experience in the sector gained working in either the United States or Europe.  In several 
cases they have obtained backing from foreign investors – either venture capital funds or 
telecommunications companies. 
 
 
Policies to Remove Barriers to Growth 
  Given  the  findings  and  analysis  above,  and  assuming  that  the  government  of 
Turkey  wishes  to  see  the  speedy  deployment  of  telecommunications  technology  and 
services as an important factor in economic growth, several policy suggestions emerge. In 
particular, the government should: 
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1.  Re-affirm its commitment to a pro-competitive policy for this sector.  Such a 
re-affirmation  would  give  direction  to  the  various  ministries  and  agencies 
involved in the telecommunication sector, in much the same manner as the 
Clinton Administration’s 1997 White House statement, “The Framework for 
Global Electronic Commerce,” did for the extraordinary expansion of internet 
commerce in the United States. 
 
2.  Reduce  the  level  of  ownership a n d  regulatory  uncertainty.  The  extended 
history of attempts to privatize TTK and the current “limbo” involving control 
of  cable  company  assets  have  drastically  increased  investment-deterring 
uncertainty and slowed the expansion of telecommunications services.  Delays 
on  the  part  of  the  Telecommunications  Authority  and  the  Minister  of 
Transportation in issuing regulations and licenses have had a similar impact. 
 
3.  Strengthen  the  Telecommunications  Authority  board  and  staff.  A  stronger 
authority will enjoy greater respect and credibility, and will be less likely to 
have its decisions appealed.  Specific steps to accomplish this would be the 
appointment of individuals with more background in the industry and upward 
adjustment of staff salary caps. 
 
4.  Ask the Telecommunications Authority and the Ministry of Transportation to 
review policies with respect to the scope and cost of licenses, as both the EU 
and  the  OECD  have  recommended.  If  the  intent  is  to  encourage 
experimentation and investment in new services, licenses should be as general 
as possible.  The fees charged should be designed to do no more than cover 
the expenses of administering the licensing regime. (Pending legislation in the 
Parliament would apparently accomplish these objectives.) 
 
5.  Redouble  its  efforts  to  improve  the  investment  climate,  with  particular 
attention  to  the  legal  system, i n  l i g h t  o f  i t s  i m p o r t a n c e  f o r  t h e  
telecommunications sector. 
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INTERVIEWS IN TURKEY 
 
In addition to many individual consultants and lawyers, individuals in the following 
organizations were extremely helpful in assisting the author: 
 
 
American Business Forum in Turkey 
Avaya 
Bank of New York 
Competition Authority of Turkey 
CSP-Mobile GmbH 
Digiturk 
Eser Telecom 
Güvercin 
IBS Research & Consultancy 
ING Bank 
Microsoft 
Motorola 
NetOne Telekom 
SATKO 
SuperOnline 
Telecommunications Authority of Turkey 
Telkoder 
Topaz Telekomunikasyon 
TopTel Telekomuikasyo 
Turk Telekom 
Turkcell 
Unitel Telekomunikasyon 
U.S. Department of Commerce 
YASED (Foreign Investors Association) 
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ENDNOTES 
 
 
1 Many studies and country comparisons combine “information technology” with “communications” 
investment as the relevant sector (“ICT”).  While it is clear that, from an operational perspective, 
telecommunications and information technology are highly dependent upon each other, the issues of 
deploying telecommunications are generally separate from policy issues in information technology. 
 
2 The European Commission recently noted “the vital role the electronic communications sector plays in 
nearly all other economic activities, and … as a potent driver of labour productivity” (Europe. 2004b, p. 2). 
 
3 Norton, p. 192. 
 
4 Ibid., p. 919. 
 
5 Burnham (2003). 
 
6 Demonstration projects for BPL (broadband over power lines) are already underway in San Diego, CA 
and Manassas, VA (Wallace, 2005). 
 
7 Of particular importance has been Moore’s Law (the number of transistors per square inch on a transistor 
tends to double every two years) and the increase in optical fiber transmission capacity. 
 
8 Europe (2002b). 
 
9 International Telecommunications Union database. 
 
10 For an excellent overview of the mobile phone sector as of 2004, see Evci et al (2004). 
 
11 If the data are expressed as phones per household, Turkey’s relative position would undoubtedly 
improve, given the significantly higher average household size. However, individuals with subscriptions to 
more than one mobile phone operator appear to be fairly common, as they take advantage of differences in 
tariff schedules (e.g. discounts for own-network calls). 
 
12 OECD (2002), p. 13. 
 
13 OECD (2004), p. 31. 
 
14 McKinsey Global Institute (2003), p. 1. 
 
15 The table is based on raw data found in tables in the OECD’s Communications Outlook, 2003. Data for 
2004 are preliminary. PPP adjusts exchange rates to reflect “purchasing power parity.” 
 
16 http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00100-rl.en0.htm. 
 
17 See, for example, the EU’s “Framework Directive,” Europe (2002a). 
 
18 Europe (2004a), p. 128. The paper by Jordana et al (2005) provides a succinct summary of the evolution 
of the EU telecommunication regulatory regime. 
 
19 OECD (2002), p. 23. 
 
20 Europe (2002b). 
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21 For example, its support of conferences aimed at training regulatory staff in EU policies and experiences 
in EU countries in implementing them. 
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